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exceptions, should be shipped by an agreement in writing specifying
certain terms and stipulations, and signed in the presence of a "shipping
commissioner." The new act provides that the above requirement shal
not apply to&vessels when engaged in trade between the United States
and the British North American possessions, or the West India islands,
or the Republic of Mexico.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.
2
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 3
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.'
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.5
BI5LS AND NOTES.
Alteration-Burden of Proof.-In an action on a note negotiable by
the law merchant, where the defendant alleges an alteration of the note
after he had signed it, if there be no indication of such alteration ap.
pearing on the face of the note, the burden of this issue is upon the
defendant: Ateikel v. State Savings Institution, 36 Ind.
Contract-Set-off-Estoppel-When a promissory note negotiable
under the statute is executed, and subsequently the payee of the note
makes a written agreement that he will accept as payment upon the note
any legal claims against him that the person who has executed the note
may obtain: such agreement does not in any manner change the rights
of the parties: Goldthwait and Another v. Bradford, 36 Ind.
After notice to the payor of an assignment of the note to a third
party, he cannot by subsequent purchase of claims against the original
payee of the note, entitle himself to a set-off against the holder : Id.
In a suit against the payee of a note to have the same declared paid,
the complaint recited that the defendant "claimed that he had sold and
assigned the said note and mortgage to" a third party, " whom plaintiff
makes defendant hereto;" and said third party filed an answer, to which
plaintiffs demurred, without moving to strike out the ansver: i/d,
that plaintiffs were estopped from denying that the person so answering
was a proper party defendant: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Contract.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Criminal Law-Marriage between Whites and Blacks-Fourteenth
I From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 57 Ills. Rep.
' From Jas. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Ind. Rep.
3 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Aid. Rep.
4 From J. M. Shirley, Esq. Reporter.; to appear in 51 N. H. Rep.
From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 8 of his Reports.
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Amendment- Civil Rights Bill.-Neither the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States nor the Civil Rights bill paqsed
by Congress, has impaired or abrogated the laws of this state on the
subject of the marriage of whites and negroes. Such a union between
members of the different races is a criminal offence by the statutes of
this state: The State v. Gibson, 36 Ind.
CONTRACT.
Illegal will not be enforced, though it might be valid in the State where
it was made- 1)mity-Lottery-Partnershp-Egpdt- Uncertainty, of
Bill.-Uncertainty in material allegations is not fatal to a bill whose
object is the discovery of uncertain facts alleged to be entirely in the
defendant's knowledge: Watson v. .Murray, 8 C. E. Green.
A bill by a partner of a lottery-firm against his copartners for disco-
very, for a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds, will
not be entertained by this court : Id.
Even were the partnership-contracts entered into in states where such
contracts are legal, this court will not enforce or administer them : Id.
A contract which, though valid and would be enforced in the state
where it was made, is in violation of a public law of this state, will not
be enforced here on the ground of comity: Id.
It will not avail the complainant that his suit is not to enforce an ille-
gal contract, but simply to compel an account and distribution of profits
already made ; such distinction cannot be invoked where the illegal act
is also a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment: Md.
DAMAGES. See Municipal Corporation; Trespass; fendar.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Resulting Tust-Gift to Wife or Child-Fraud of 6-editors-
.ortgage.-If a man when insolvent or in debt advances uhoney as a
gift to his wife or her father, they being at the time ignorant of the in-
debtedness or insolvency, and the donees receive the money in good
faith, supposing that the donor was perfectly solvent, and that the gift
could not injure his creditors, present or future, and was not intended
for such purpose, and purchase property or enter into business with the
money, but afterwards, upon learning of the embarrassment of the
donor, pay him back in full the amount received, there is no fraud in
such transaction, or any other ground to infer or create a trust for future
or even existing creditors in the property purchased, and its advances, or
in the profits of the business after the money is returned, or even while
it is kept in good faith :. Wheeler v. Kirtland, 8 0. E. Green.
A trust is held to result by operation of law, when one purchases land
with his own money and takes the conveyance in the name of another;
in such case the title is deemed to be in trust for him who advanced the
money: Id.
If one purchase land and take the title in the name ofhis wife or child,
it will be held to be a settlement on the wife, or an advancement to the
child, unless it is shown to have been otherwise intended, and no trust
will result: Id.
But in such case, if the purchaser takes the deed in the name of his
wife or child for the purpose of defrauding or delaying creditors, and
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not for the purpose of making a settlement or advancement, a trust will
result to the purchaser, and the land be liable to his debts: Id.
When the person to whom the conveyance is made makes the bargain
for the purchase for his own benefit, and obtains part or even the whole
of the purchase-money from another, who knows that it is to be paid
for a conveyance to the grantee for his own benefit, no resulting trust
can arise: Id.
When a wife purchases real estate for her own benefit, and the pur-
cl,ase is understood to be made for that purpose by the husband, and
he advances the money therefor as a gift, no resulting trust is thereby
created in him for the benefit of his creditors: Id.
When the person to whom the conveyance is made pays part of the
purchase-moucy, no trust results to any one who advances the residue,
unless the part of the purchase-money paid by him in whose favor the
resulting trust is sought to be enforced is shown to have been paid for
some specific part or distinct interest in the estate for some aliquot part,
a general contribution of a sum of money toward the entire purchase is
not sufficient: Id.
A mortgage given by a husband to a trustee for his wife, after he had
become a member of a firm of which she had gone out, to secure to her
the capital which she had contributed to the firm, but which had be-
come insolvent before she left it, is void as against creditors of the
firm : Id.
A mortgage given by a father to secure to a son money of the son
used by the father in the business of the firm, though given when the
firm was insolvent, is valid: Id.
Mortgage reformed by substituting "heirs" for "successors," it having
been the evident intention to mortgage the fee, such reformation will
not affect a subsequent judgment, the record of the mortgage being the
only notice at the entry of the judgment, and that notice being of a
conveyance for life only: Id.
BASEMENT.
Prescrption-Ttle by Uer.-A. was the owner of adjoining farms,
Nos. 1 and 2. Upon No. 2 was a well, from which B., occupying No. 1
by permission of A., with the understanding that he would subsequently
purchase it, was accustomed to draw water for use upon the premises.
This occupation continued thus by permission about eighteen years,
when B. acquired a legal title thereto by purchase. In these circum-
stances he drew water at his pleasure from the well for more than
twenty years, when such use of the well was forbidden and interrupted
by C., who had purchased No. 2. Held, that B. had acquired no title
to the use of the well by twenty years' enjoyment thereof: Stevens v.
Dennett, 51 N. H.
Where the plaintiff brought an action for the interruption of the
enjoyment of a well, as an easement appurtenant to his estate and pos-
session,-held, that it was not competent for him to show that the same
well had been used for sixty years as a public watering-place : Id.
Mer ger-Creatiorn by Implication.-No one can have an easement in
his own lands, and if an easement exists, if the owner of the dominant
or servient tenement acquire the other, the easement is extinguished:
Diston, v. Leddell, 8 C. E. Green.
Vol. XXI,-21
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But if the owner of a tract of land of which one part has had the
benefit of a drain, water-pipe, or watercourse, or other artificial advan-
tage in the nature of an easement through or in the other part, sells or
devises either part, an easement is created by implication, in or to the
other part. And this is the case even if it is the servient part that is
sold or devised. But this is confined to continuous and apparent ease-
ments : Id.
The testator devised to the defendant a tract of land on which were
a saw-mill, dam and mill-pond. He devised to the complainant a farm
through which the mill-stream flowed to the defendant's land. By a
subsequent clause in the will he gave to the defendant, as appurtenant
to the saw-mill upon the tract devised to him, "the right to the owners
of the mill at all times thereafter to raise the water in the pond till the
surface of the water should reach a mark * * * on a rock," &c.
The testator directed that the land devised to the complainant should
be "subject to said right and privilege as aforesaid, and subject to such
fiowage and damage as might be consequent on such raising of the
water." Ifeld, that the defendant is restricted to the mark in the rock
as the limit to which he can raise the water on the complainant's laud.
The clause limiting the right of flowage restricts the defendant from
raising the water to the height to which it was raised by the dam at
the testator's death : Id.
The clause restricting the height to which the defendant may raise
the water on complainant's land does not limit the height at which
defendant may keep his dam, except that he cannot keep it at any
height in such a state that it throw back water higher than the limit so
fixed: Id.
EQUITY. See Contract; Mortgage; Vendor.
Complainant must be free from Negligence.-Where a party has iuf.
tered judgment to go against him in a suit at law when he had a valid
defence, a court of equity will, as a general rule, refuse to relieve him
Robinson v. Wheeler, 51 N. H.
If a discovery is needed to enable him to establish his defence, he
will be required, ordinarily, to seek it while the suit at law is pending,
or equity will not relieve him: Id.
If any fact is disclosed that clearly shows it to be contrary to equity
and good conscience to execute a judgment obtained at law, and the
party could not avail himself of it as a defence, or was prevented doing
it by accident or the fraud of the other party, unmixed with any fault
or negligence of himself or his agents, he may apply to equity for relief:
But if his defence at law fails because he could not be a witness for
the reason that the other party is an administrator, his bill in equity not
disclosing any new and de2isive evidence, but merely seeking a new trial,
the bill will be held bad on demurrer: Id.
.sae-Lachcs i, al)Ily/ijg for-Nitdsafice.-Whcre a question was one
pr,,wr to be tried on an issue directed, if such issue had been applied
4,)r, but both parties have proceeded to take testimony at great length
anl dlowed the hearing to be brought on without applying tor an issue,
it is the province and duty of this court to decide, if the evidence is
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such that the court can arrive at a satisfactory conclusion : Duston v.
Leddell, 8 C. E. Green.
Where the fact of a nuisance is clear, especially when it is not dis.
puted, a court of equity will interfere without a trial at law: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Sunday.
By witnessing Deed.-If a party claiming the right to the use of a
well situated upon premises about to be conveyed by deed, being present
at the execution of the deed and understanding its contents, signs the same
as a witness thereto, and does not disclose to the purchaser the fact that ne
had any claim to the use of the well, and if the purchaser, being ignorant
of the party's claim, would not have purchased if he had known thereof,
the party will not be permitted, in an action against the purchaser, to
set up his claim to the use of the well, even though his omission to
disclose the same was only an act of gross negligence, and not of bad
faith : Stevens v. Dennett, 51,N. H.
The distinction between an equitable and a legal estoppel by matter
inpais commented upon: d.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Pleadings-D emrrer.-Where a plea justifies an imprisonment under
an order of the county court, but the defendant admits that, as the
attorney of a creditor of the estate, he procured the arrest and imprison-
ment, and attempts to set up in his plea the facts upon which the arrest
and committal were made, the plea should show all the facts necessary
to give the court jurisdiction, and such a compliance with the statute
as justified the county court in issuing the attachment and ordering the
committal: Von Ketler v. Johnson, 57 Ills.
FORMER REcOVERtY.
Evidence-Bar of Former Judgment-D ferent Parties.-In a suit
between two persons: a judgment between other parties than those to
the action pending cannot be used as a bar to a recovery, nor can such
a judgment between the same parties be so used unless the former suit
was fbr the identical same cause of action, and the same breaches sued
for in the action being tried: Hiller v. McManis, 57 Ills.
A plea of former recovery is not sustained by the record of a judg-
ment on an agreement of a different date, nor is such evidence admissi-
ble because of the variance. Nor can the record of a judgment on an
agreement entered into in 1864, be read in evidence, under a plea of
former recovery, to an action on contracts entered into in 1863 and 1866.
This proof is variant and does not sustain the plea: Id.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Debtor and Creditor.
Agreement by Wife to convey-Equity-Parties.-An agreement to
convey from one married woman to another is inoperative and void:
Tannard v. Littell, 8 0. E. Green.
To a bill by a feme covert, by her next friend, for her separate estate
hr husband is a necessary party: Id.
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INSURANCE.
Parol Testimony--Danages- Double Insurances - Co'ibiton.-
Where a policy of insurance states that "the company insures the Bal-
timore Warehouse Company against loss or damage by fire to the amount
of $20,000 on merchandise their own, or held by them in trust, or in
which they have an interest or liability," parol proof is not admissible
to show that the policy does not cover " merchandise their own," &e., as
therein stated; but was intended to cover the merchandise only under
certain circumstances; and if the said merchandise was insured by the
owners thereof in other companies, that the interest of the warehouse
company in said policy was not insured at all: Hough v. .ls. Co., 36 Md.
The Baltimore Warehouse Company, which received goods on storage,
and issued receipts or certificates therefor to the depositors, effected an
insurance in the Associated Fireman's Company for $10,000, against
loss by fire for one year, 11 on merchandise generally, hazardous or extra
hazardous, held by them, or in trust, contained" in a particular ware-
house; they also took out a policy in the Home Insurance Company, to
the amount of $20,000, "on merchandise, hazardous or extra hazardous.
their own, or held by them in trust, or in which they had an interest or
liability," contained in the same warehouse. The appellants, on the
20th of June 1870, deposited fifteen bales of cotton in the same ware-
house, and received a receipt or certificate therefor from the Warehouso,
Company, and on the same day procured a policy of insurance on the
cotton so deposited from the appellee. On the 27th of June they de.
posited thirteen bales, for which a like receipt was given, and on the
same day they effected an insurance for the cotton with the appellee.
Under the policies issued to the appellants, the loss, if any, was payable
to the Baltimore Warehouse Company. The appellants had other cotton
to a large amount stored with the Warehouse Company. The Ware-
house Company advanced to the appellants over $48,000 upon the cotton
belonging to them, and stored in the warehouse. In the policies to the
appellants, as well as in those to the Warehouse Company, it was stipu-
lated that in case of loss the assured should not be entitled to recover
on such policy any greater proportion of the loss or damage sustainel
to the subject insured, than the amount thereby insured should bear to
the whole amount of the several insurances thereon. On the 18th of
July 1870, the warehouse was burned, and of the cotton stored therein.
some of the bales were saved, some were partially destroyed, and others
totally destroyed. In an action by the appellants, for the use of the
Warehouse Company, on the policies of insurance issued by the appellee.
it was Held: That the policies sued on, having been made payable to the
Warehouse Company, inured to the benefit of the Company, and may
be considered as in favor of the same assured, on the same interest, in
the same subject, and against the same risks as the policies which were
issued directly to the Warehouse Company; and with the latter policies
constituted a double insurance; and the companies therefore issuing the
policies were bound to contribute their respective proportions of the
loss: Rd.
A person having goods in his possession as consignee, or on comnins-
sion, may insure them in his own name, and, in the event of loss, recover
the full amount of the insurance, and, after satistlyiu, his own claim,
hold the balance as trustee for the owner: Id.
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The words "held in trust," applied to goods insured, mean goods with
which the assured is intrusted; not goods held in trust in the strict
technical sense, so held that there is only an equitable obligation in the
assured, enforceable by subpcna in chancery, but goods with which they
are intrusted in the ordinary sense of the word : Id.
JUDGMENT. See Debtor and Creditor.
Effect of a Judgment by Default.-When a judgment by default has
been entered, it is error in the court to enter a judgment of non pros.,
because the verdict or inquisition of the jury was for a sum below the
jurisdiction of the court. The judgment by default is conclusive of
the question of jurisdiction: Cooper v. Roche, 36 Md.
But a judgment by default does not settle the right of the plaintiff
to recover the amount stated in his cause of action. The defendant is
entitled to have an inquisition by the jury: Id.
JURY.
Interrogatories to Jury-Answers.-The court instructed the jury
that if there was such a want of evidence as to any fact to which an
interrogatory was directed that they could not determine the affirmative
or negative, they should so answer. Held, that the instruction was
erroneous ; that if there was evidence on the subject, the jury must
determine or disagree : Afaxwell v. Boyne, 36 Ind.
MILL-DAM. See Nuisance.
MORTGAGE. See Debtor and Creditor.
Eguit- Correction of istae.-Where personal property is correctly
described in a chattel-mortgage, but the lot of ground upon which it is
situated is misdescribed, such misdescription will be rejected as sur-
plusage, and equity will not take jurisdiction to make a useless correc-
tion of the mortgage: Spaulding v. .fozier, 57 Ills.
In such a case parol evidence would be admissible to establish the
identity of the property, and in this the law affords a full and complete
remedy, and it must be sought on the common-law side of the court: Id.
Foreclosure-Scire Facias-Setting aside Sale-Laches.-It is legal
and proper for the mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage by scirefacias for
the use of another person. And such a judgment is valid and con-
elusive upon parties and privies, the latter being of three kinds-by
blood, in law and by estate. The heirs of a defendant to such a pro.
ceeding are privies, and concluded by the judgment: Winchell v. Ed.
wards, 57 Ills.
Although the execution is valid, and both the judgment and execu-
tion properly described in the land, an irregularity in selling en masse
instead of in parcels, gives the defendant a right to have the sale set
aside, and so with other irregularities, but the right may be lost by
laches: Id.
Where a defendant was present at the sale, and cognisant of the judg-
ment and manner in which the sale was conducted, and remaining in
the country for nearly a year after the time for redemption had expired,
and taking no steps to set the sale aside, and then leaving for California,
there arises a strong presumption of acquiescence, and his heirs can be
in no better position: Id.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Street Improvements-A uthority to make- Conseguential Damages.--
The authorities of towns and cities have ample power to lay out, open,
grade, regrade, level and pave or gravel streets and alleys, and to estab-
lish drains and sewers, culverts and embankments, whenever they are
necessary for the improvement of such streets and alleys; and where
the work is done with proper care and skill, and without malice, the town
or city will not be liable for any consequential damages that may result
therefrom: Oity of Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind.
Where the land of the citizen is not actually appropriated in the
making of such improvements, the owner is not entitled to have the
damages first assessed and tendered; but where it becomes necessary in
the making such improvements to appropriate and use the real estate of
a citizen, his damages must be first assessed and tendered: Id.
NUISANCE. See Equity.
Mill-Dam-Interrogatories.-In an action to recover damages for the
erection and maintenance of a mill-dam which caused the overflow of
the plaintiff's land, and asking to have the same abated as a private
nuisance, the court submitted an interrogatory to the jury as to the
height of the dam at the time of the trial, and also an interrogatory
whether the dam was higher at that time thau it was when the mill-pro-
perty was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant's grantor. To both of
these interrogatories the plaintiff objected. Held, that the interrogato-
ries were proper; that the answers might aid the court in determining
whp.ther the nuisance should be abated; but that the evidence on these
points should not affect the question of the plaintiff's recovery of dam-
ages: Maxwell v. Boyne, 36 Ind.
The discretion resting in the court as to ordering the abatement of a
private nuisance is a legal discretion, to be exercised affirmatively when-
ever the interests or happiness of individuals or the community may
require it: Id.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See Stream.
STATUTES.
Re rospective.-Children have and can have no vested rights as heir,%
in their father's estate, while the father lives: 11Morgan v. lPcrj, 51 N. II.
A statute altering the descent of intestate estates, which applies only
to estates to be settled after its passage, is not retrospective : Id.
Tberefore a statute that should provide that " where, after the birth
of an illegitimate child, his parents have intermarried or shall inter-
marry, and have recognised, or shall after such marriage recognise such
child as their own, such child shall inherit equally with other children,
and shall be deemed legitimate," would not be objectionable as a retro-
spective law: Id.
STREA M.
Alltivion-Diision among adjoining Owners.-Tand formed by allu-
vioi. on the bank of a river not navigable, by the gradual wearing away
of the opposite bank, is to be divided, ordinarily, among the riparian
owners entitled to it according to this rule: Ascertain the length of the
old shore-liue, and of the part of it belonging to each proprietor; then
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measure off for each proprietor a part of the new shore-line in propor-
tion to what he held in the old shore-line; and then draw lines from the
boundaries at the ancient bank to the points of division on the new
shore, as thus ascertained. In this way, if such land is formed in the
bend of a river, and the new shore-line is just one-half the length of
the old one, each proprietor will take of the new shore-line just one-half
the extent of his former shore-line: Batchelder v. Keniston, 51 N. H.
STREET. See Municipal Corporation.
SUNDAY.
Estoppel.-Admissions which would otherwise operate as an estoppel,
if acted upon, are not rendered inoperative because made on Sunday,
no contracD being then completed: Riley v. Butler, 36 Ind.
TRESPASS.
Railroad-Appropriation.-Where a railroad company has, without the
consent of the owner, and without color of title, entered upon land and
occupied the same, building a depot and hotel thereon, and afterward
seeks to appropriate the land under the authority of law, the value of
the land at the time of the legal appropriation, with the improvement
thereon, constitutes the amount for which the company is liable to the
owner of the land: Graham v. C. and N . Railroad Co., 36 Ind.
TRUST. See Debtor and Creditor.
Resulting from Payment of Purchase-Honey.-When a trust is sought
to be raised as a resulting trust from the purchase-money, the proof
must be clear of the payment of the purchase-money by the person in
whose favor a trust is sought to be raised. Such a trust must also arise
at the time of the execution of the deed. It cannot be raised from sub-
isequent matter arising ex post facto: Tunnard v. Littell, 8 0. E. Green.
USURY.
Plea of-Variance-.EVidence.-Where a plea of usury in a suit in
the Superior Court of Chicago, averred that defendant had paid $150
for forbearance in the payment of $3850, for seventy-five days, and the
affidavit of merits required by a rule of that court stated that the note
sued on was given for the balance due on another note and that defend-
ant paid $125 for forbearance in the payment of such balance for
seventy-eight days: Held, that the affidavit of merits was insufficient,
inasmuch as the defence it disclosed could not be given in evidence
under the plea of usury: Prank v. Morris, 57 Ills.
Where a plea of usury averred the payment of $150 to procure for-
bearance, and the evidence showed but $125 thus paid: Held, there was
such a variance as to exclude the evidence. The defence of usury being
penal in its nature the proof must be strict to sustain the defence: Id.
As usury rendered the contract void at the common law, it could be
proved under the plea of non assumpsit, like any other defence which
showed the contract void, released or discharged. But under our statute
the creditor only forfeits the entire interest, and hence the defence does
not render the contract void or defeat a recovery of the principal, and
the reason for allowing the defence under the plea of non aszimpsit
does not apply, and the defence of usury must be made by special plea,
under our statute : 1d.
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Trust.
Covenant-Damages for Breach.-In contracts for the purchase and
sale of real estate, where the vendee refuses to receive the deed and
pay for the land, the measure of damages which the vendor may recover
in a suit at law is the difference between the price agreed to be paid for
the land, and its real value at the time the contract was broken : Gris-
wold v. Sabin, 51 N. H.
in such case, where the defendant refuses to receive the deed and pay
for the land, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff keeps or sells the
land, and if he sells it, he is not bound to obtain the defendant's consent
to the sale, or to consult him in relation thereto: Id.
Title-Specific Performance- Want of Possession by Vendor-Notice
to Purchaser-Laches.-W here a party seeking specific performance of
a contract for the conveyance of lands claims an allowance for the value
of a certain tract to which he alleges the defendant has no title, he must
show a title out of the defendant: Davit v. Pierrepont, 8 0. E. Green.
When a third party is in possession of the tract under the defendant
at the date of the agreement, as against such third party, the title must
be taken to be in the defendant until the contrary appears by positive
proof: Il.
A claim for deduction on account of the want of possession of a part
of the premises refused, because the words in the agreement for con-
veyance described that tract "a small piece near the said road in the
tenure of Mrs. Thiteford" was a declaration that the defendant's estate
was that of landlord or reversioner, and the fair construction and opera-
tion of the contract is to convey subject to the estate which she might
have in the premises : rd.
The complainant's knowledge that Mrs. W. had occupied the lot for
many years at the date of the agreement was sufficient notice to put him
upon inquiry, and he must be charged with the notice he would have
had if lie had made inquiry: Id.
Though a verbal understanding cannot alter a written agreement, yet
if the agreement without it did not warrant the construction given to it,
a court of equity would not compel specific performance of it in a man-
ner contrary to the understanding between the parties at the time : Id.
Specific performance will not be decreed when it is against equity
under the circumstances of the case : Id.
The gross neglect on the part of the complainant in the payment of
interest and principal previous to the contract, and his laches in not
tendering payment and bringing suit for nineteen years after he should
have paid the whole consideration, and then not until an ejectment was
comnmenced against him, would deprive him of the right to performance,
if the defendant was not willing to perform: Id.
VERDICT.
llcre regula,.-Where two suits between the same parties are con-
solidated into one, it is not error in the jury, trying the consolidated
uit, to render but one verdict, and if it had been, still the objection
wis waived by failing to make any objection to it in the court below:
JUIil v. Xlillanis, 57 Ills.
